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Abstract
We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment
bene￿t level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage
￿exibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks.
Long-term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher
expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower bene￿ts reduce
the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term
than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts.
Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with
lower bene￿ts also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.
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There exists a large theoretical and empirical literature on how various labour-market
institutions in￿uence the equilibrium rate of unemployment, i.e. the average rate of
unemployment around which there are cyclical variations (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991;
Elmeskov et al. 1998; or Nickell and Layard, 1999). Much less is known about how various
institutions aﬀect the sensitivity of the economy to macroeconomic shocks. The aim here
is to analyse how one speci￿c labour-market institution, unemployment insurance, may
aﬀect money-wage ￿exibility and thus the cyclical sensitivity of the economy.
It is often taken for granted that the same labour-market reforms will both lower
equilibrium unemployment and stabilise employment in the case of macroeconomic shocks
(e.g. OECD, 1994). The basic presumption seems to be that reforms make labour markets
more competitive (Calmfors, 1999). However, it remains to be modelled exactly how
various reforms, such as a reduction of unemployment bene￿ts, may aﬀect, for example,
the length of wage contracts and thus the variability of output and employment.
The models of how unemployment bene￿ts aﬀect real wages and equilibrium unemploy-
ment usually have ￿rm microeconomic underpinnings. There is a multitude of approaches
(union and bargaining models, insider-outsider models, eﬃciency-wage models, search
and matching models) that all predict that higher unemployment compensation leads to
higher real wages and higher equilibrium unemployment (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990; Layard
et al., 1991; or Holmlund, 1998).
The standard method to analyse money-wage rigidity is to view the optimal contract
length as the outcome of a trade-oﬀ between contract costs and costs of output variability
(see e.g. Ball, 1987; and Ball et al., 1988). Long contract periods have the bene￿to f
holding down contract costs, but also the drawback that money wages cannot change
in response to events that were unforeseen when the contract was struck. The optimal
contract length is chosen so that the sum of these costs is minimised. The costs to be
1minimised are usually modelled in an ad hoc way by assuming quadratic loss functions,
which are analytically convenient. This suﬃces to derive results such that contract length
will be reduced if nominal shocks become more prevalent. But the ad-hoc objective
functions make it diﬃcult to analyse the eﬀects of such labour-market reforms as, for
example, changes in unemployment bene￿t levels. Nor is it clear to which extent the
choice of contract length re￿ects incentives on the employee side and to which extent it
re￿ects incentives on the employer side.
Here, we use a simple trade union model, which we later extend to a bargaining
framework, to explain how both the average real wage over the cycle and the extent of
money-wage ￿exibility depend on unemployment compensation. In the model, wage set-
ters determine both nominal wages and contract length. There is unemployment because
unions aim for a higher real wage than the market-clearing level.
There exist two standard ways of modelling unemployment bene￿ts, which also have
real-world counterparts (Layard et al., 1991; Pissarides, 1998). The ￿rst is to assume that
governments set unemployment bene￿ts in real terms. The second way is to assume a
￿xed replacement rate, i.e. that unemployment compensation is set as a ￿xed percentage
of the aggregate wage. Here, we choose the ￿rst approach.1
Our conclusion is that higher unemployment bene￿ts, apart from increasing equilib-
rium unemployment, also lead to more rigid money wages and hence to larger macroeco-
nomic variability. This result is consistent with the general principle that real rigidities
reinforce the eﬀects of nominal rigidities (see e.g. Romer, 1996, Ch. 6). The intuition
for our conclusion is the following. Wage setters choose contract length by comparing the
higher costs of short-term contracts with the utility gain that follows from the possibility
1It would seem to correspond to the way that unemployment bene￿ts are set in the U.K (see e.g.
Minford, 1994). In many other countries, unemployment insurance would seem to be a mixture of the
two systems discussed. In, for example, Sweden there is a ￿xed replacement rate for medium-income
earners, but this does not apply to low-income earners, who instead receive a minimum bene￿tt h a ti s
unrelated to the earlier wage, and not to high-income earners, for whom there is a bene￿t ceiling. In
many European countries, it is also common with minimum unemployment (social) assistance levels for
long-term unemployed that have lost their eligibility for ordinary unemployment bene￿ts (OECD, 1994).
2to adjust wages to unforeseen shocks. We show that wage setters aim for higher real wages
with long-term than with short-term contracts. Hence, unemployment is larger with long-
term than with short-term contracts. As a consequence, an increase in the unemployment
bene￿t raises the expected utility of a representative union member more if contracts are
long-term than if they are short-term. So a higher bene￿t reduces the utility gain from
short-term contracts for unions and thus makes long-term contracts more favourable.
The described result does not follow because higher unemployment compensation re-
duces the welfare cost of employment variability per se. Instead, it is the consequence
of the feature that our model does not exhibit certainty equivalence. In that regard, our
paper relates to other recent work stressing how lack of certainty equivalence can ￿com-
pound or oﬀset the more obvious welfare eﬀects of uncertainty￿ (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
2000). Other papers are Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998), Devereaux and Engel (1998,
1999), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998), and Rankin (1998). However, none of these papers
explore the issue we focus on: the determination of the degree of nominal rigidity.
Our analysis also shows that a rise in the bene￿t level will lead to a tax eﬀe c tt h a tt e n d s
to increase contract length if contracts costs are not deductible for tax purposes. Because
ah i g h e rb e n e ￿t implies a higher tax rate, there will be a reduction of the after-tax income
gain from a short-term contract, which is to be set against the non-deductible contract
cost. Finally, if contract costs are related to wages, higher unemployment compensation
raises contract costs because wages are pushed up. This may also work in the direction
of longer contract periods.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model using
a monopoly-union framework with risk-neutral agents. Section 3 shows how wages and
employment depend on contract length, and Section 4 analyses the determination of
contract length. Section 5 extends the analysis to a bargaining framework, and Section
6 discusses other possible modi￿cations, such as, for example, an assumption of risk
aversion. Section 7 concludes.
32. The basic model
The economy consists of a large number of identical perfectly competitive ￿rms. They
produce a homogenous tradable, the price of which is exogenous to the economy. There
is a ￿xed pool of workers attached to each ￿rm, so there is no labor mobility between
￿rms, and workers are organized in ￿rm-speci￿c unions. (The assumption of zero labour
mobility is not important for the results, but it simpli￿es the analysis considerably.) There
are two types of shocks: nominal price shocks and real supply shocks.






where 0 < α < 1,Y is output, θ is an economy-wide productivity variable and L is
employment.
The real pro￿t, π,o fa￿rm is












where ε =1 /(1 − α) > 1 is the labour demand elasticity.
Productivity θ and the price P are stochastic variables. In most of the analysis, we
only have to assume that the probability distributions are known and independent. To
derive some results, we shall, however, impose an assumption of log-normality.














(1 − t)b, (4)
4where U is the gross utility of the union (neglecting contract costs), L0 is the number
of members, t is the tax rate and b is the real value of unemployment compensation.
The objective of the union is thus to maximize the expected income of a representative
member.2 We shall assume that labour demand is always smaller than union membership,
i.e. L<L 0. Both wage income and unemployment compensation are taxed.
2.1. Choice of contract length
A union can choose between one-period and two-period contracts. The information struc-
ture is depicted in Figure 1. Price and productivity shocks occur in the beginning of
each period. If a new wage is set in the period, wage setting occurs after shocks have
been realised. One-period contracts are thus always concluded on the basis of the actual
shocks. The wage is then set so as to maximize the union￿s utility function (4).I ft h e r e
is a two-period contract, wage setters know the actual price and productivity shocks for
the ￿rst period and thus set the same wage for this period as in a one-period contract.
But for the second period they have to base the wage decision on expectations. So the
second-period wage is set by maximizing the expectation of the union￿s utility function.
A key assumption is that the unemployment bene￿ti s￿x e di nr e a lt e r m s . T h i si s
equivalent to assuming that the government has a target for the real bene￿t level and
adjusts the nominal bene￿t to the actual price in each period independent of the length
of wage contracts. The assumption captures the stylized fact that there appears to be more
nominal inertia in wage setting than in government transfer systems: nominal wages are
often set in wage contracts that may encompass several years, wheras long-term decisions
on nominal transfer levels are rare. Instead, the latter are usually determined in the
annual government budget process, possibly through an explicit indexation procedure.3
2One might ask what purpose unemployment insurance serves if workers are risk-neutral as in (4),
in which case there is no welfare gain from evening out incomes between states of employment and
unemployment. A possible political-economy answer is that the political majority of workers may vote
for unemployment insurance, because it raises the wage level and hence shifts the income distribution in
favour or labour (Saint-Paul, 1996).
3We do not attempt to model formally why nominal transfer are less rigid than nominal wages. But
5In our model, there is a ￿xed cost CU of writing a wage contract. The cost varies
across unions according to a cumulative distribution function F (CU). F is continuous
and diﬀerentiable, F (0) = 0,a n dF 0 (CU) > 0 for all CU such that 0 <F(CU) < 1.
We shall examine both the case when the contract cost is deductible for tax purposes
(which is analytically the simpler one) and the case when it is not (which is the more
realistic one). In the former case, the after-tax contract cost is C =( 1− t)CU,i nt h e
latter case it is C = CU. The fraction of unions that write one-period contracts is x.
Each union chooses contract length by comparing the net utilities of one two-period and
two one-period contracts that are obtained when contract costs are taken into account.
The contract cost for a two-period contract is paid in the ￿rst period. Because the wage
a n dt h u sg r o s su t i l i t yi nt h e￿rst period is independent of contract length, the comparison
only involves the expected net utilities of the second period. One-period contracts are
chosen if
E (U1) − C>E(U2),
where E (U1) is the expected utility from a one-period contract and E (U2) is the expected
utility in the second period of a two-period contract. When the contract cost is deductible,








When the contract cost is not deductible, the cut-oﬀ point is instead E (U1)−CU = E (U2),
a n dw eh a v ei n s t e a d
x = F (E (U1) − E (U2)). (6)
a plausible - though partial - explanation is that the cost of changing nominal transfer levels are small if
budget decisions on how to balance government revenues and expenditures have to be taken anyway.
62.2. The government budget constraint
Government expenditures consist only of unemployment bene￿ts, which are ￿nanced by
a uniform tax on all labour incomes, including bene￿ts. The tax rate, t,i ss e ts ot h a t
the government budget is balanced on average, i.e. so that expected tax revenues each
period match expected expenditures. This is equivalent to assuming that the government
budget works as an automatic stabiliser, so that temporary surpluses or de￿cits may arise














=( 1− t)[xb(L0 − E (L1)) + (1 − x)b(L0 − E (L2))],
(7)
where 1 and 2 subscripts refer to one-period and two-period contracts, respectively.5 The
LHS gives expected tax revenues, taking into account that the expected tax base may
depend on the relative frequency of the two types of contracts. The RHS gives expected
after-tax expenditures on unemployment bene￿ts.
3. The impact of contract length
The ￿rst step is to analyse how the wage, employment and union gross utility (income)
depend on the length of the wage contract.
3.1. One-period contracts
With one-period contracts, each union sets the nominal wage on the basis of the actual
price and productivity levels that have been realised. Each union is so small that it takes






4The assumption that expected rather than actual revenues and expenditures balance simpli￿es some
computations greatly, but it is not important for the results.
5We write out the government budget constraint only for the second period because it is only the
second-period tax rate that matters for the choice of contract length.
7With constant-elastic labour demand, a monopoly union sets the money wage so that the
real wage is a ￿xed mark-up on real unemployment compensation (see e.g. Layard et al.,
1991; or Nickell and Layard, 1999). With labour mobility, the mark-up would depend on
aggregate employment in the economy (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell and Layard, 1999),
but this would not change the analysis qualitatively. Supply shocks do not aﬀect the real
wage, as was ￿rst pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981).


















(1 − t)b. (10)
(10) will prove a convenient way of writing expected utility. It depends positively on
expected employment. So to derive the sign of the eﬀects of various changes on expected
utility, we need only compute the eﬀect on expected employment.
If we assume that productivity, θ, is log-normally distributed, i.e. that ln θ ∼
N (0,σ2

































More variability in productivity thus raises expected employment, and hence also, ex-
pected utility.6
6It should be noted that the assumption of a log-normal distribution for productivity is not necessary
for increased variability to increase expected employment. Because θ ε is convex, a mean-preserving
increase in θ would also raise E (L1).
83.2. Two-period contracts
The second-period wage, W2, of a two-period contract (which we shall henceforth refer to








The nominal wage in a two-period contract, which is set under uncertainty, is also a mark-
up on the unemployment bene￿t. But the mark-up now depends also on E (P ε)/E (P ε−1).
If we assume the distribution of P to be log-normal, i.e. ln P ∼ N (0,σ2
P),i tc a nb ed e -
rived that E (P ε)/E (P ε−1)=e x p( σ2








P (ε − 1/2)
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b. (12)

























follows from Jensen￿s inequality.8















7Similar formulas have been derived by Andersen and Słrensen (1988), Słrensen (1992), Rankin
(1998), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000).





ε−1.L e tP ε−1 = x,s ot h a t
P ε = f (x)=x
ε








ε−1 or E (f (x)) >f(E (x)).
According to Jensen￿s inequality this holds if f is convex, which is the case here. Harald Lang pointed
out the proof to us.
































Expected employment thus decreases if price variability increases. From (14) we then
know that expected utility also decreases.














i.e. expected employment (and hence also expected utility) with a two-period contract
increases with the amount of supply shocks, just as was the case with a one-period con-
tract.
3.3. Comparison of one-period and two-period contracts
It is readily established that expected employment and expected gross utility are larger
under one-period contracts than under two-period contracts. (9) and (13) give







−ε > 0, (15)
(10) and (14) together with (15) give
E (U1) − E (U2)=
1
(ε − 1)
(E (L1) − E (L2))
L0
(1 − t)b>0. (16)
The diﬀerence in expected utility between one-period and two-period contracts is thus
proportional to the diﬀerence in expected employment.
The result that E (L1) >E(L2) means that certainty equivalence does not hold in
our model. What is the intuition? There are two factors at work. On one hand, ex-
pected employment is aﬀected by variations of the real wage around a given expected
10level. Because the labour demand schedule is convex, as shown in Figure 2, the real wage
variability that arises with a two-period contract tends to give higher expected employ-
ment than the constant real wage with a one-period contract. But on the other hand, the
expected real wage is higher with a two-period contract than with a one-period contract.






























In Appendix A we show that the result that E (W2/P) >E(W1/P) is general. The higher
real wage in a two-period contract than in a one-period contract works in the direction of
lower expected employment. The real-wage eﬀect dominates the eﬀe c tt h a ta r i s e sb e c a u s e
of the convexity of the labour demand schedule.
The higher expected real wage in a two-period than in a one-period contract can be
explained by help of Figure 3, where union utility is drawn as a function of the real wage.
The crucial factor is that the utility function exhibits decreasing concavity around the
maximum.9 Under certainty in a one-period contract, the union chooses the real wage ω.
Under uncertainty in a two-period contract, the union can set the nominal wage so that
the same expected real wage ω is obtained. But then the union will make a larger utility
loss if the real wage, because of a high price realisation, turns out to be (1 − k)ω than if
it, because of a low price realisation, turns out to be (1 + k)ω. This creates an incentive
to choose a higher expected real wage than ω.10
It should be noted that price variability is a necessary condition for expected employ-
9At the maximum, it holds that ∂U3/∂W3 =2( ε +1 )( ε − 1)W−ε−2 > 0. The crucial assumptions
that give this are constant-elastic demand and constant relative risk aversion (zero in the analysis above).
10The reasoning is taken from Słrensen (1992). In a setting similar to ours, he and earlier Andersson
and Słrensen (1988), showed that the expected log of the real wage, E (lnW − lnP), is higher under
uncertainty than under certainty and the expected log of employment, E (lnL),l o w e r .A st h e yp o i n t e d
out, based on Rotschild and Stiglitz (1971), this result is not general, but it will always obtain with
a log-normal price distribution. The diﬀerence in our analysis is that we look at the expectations of
the unlogged real wage and employment levels. Our results that E (W/P) is higher and E (L) lower
under uncertainty than under certainty about prices are general and do not presuppose any speci￿c
probability distributions. Rankin (1998) derives the similar, but not identical, result that increased
monetary unceratinty will reduce the (unlogged) ￿natural rate￿ of employment, which he de￿n e sa st h e
employment level when monetary variables take their expected values.
11ment and expected gross utility to diﬀer between one-period and two-period contracts. If
there were only productivity shocks, but no price uncertainty, then the same real wage
w o u l db ec h o s e ni no n e - p e r i o da n dt w o - p e r i o dc o n t r a c t sa n dφ =1 . This follows because
the real wage under certainty is invariant to productivity shocks. Variability in produc-
tivity has an eﬀect on the diﬀerence in expected employment only when it interacts with
variability in the price. This is clear as E (θ ε) enters multiplicatively in the expression
for E (L1) − E (L2). With log-normal probability distributions, we obtain

















Increased variability of both the price and productivity thus increases the diﬀerence in
expected employment, and hence also the diﬀerence in expected utility, between one-
period and two-period contracts.
4. Macroeconomic variability, unemployment beneﬁts and con-
tract length
Below, we are mainly interested in the eﬀect of the unemployment bene￿t level on contract
length. This analysis holds for all probability distributions. The assumption of log-normal
distributions is made only when we discuss the eﬀects of increased variability.
4.1. Deductible contract costs
We ￿rst examine the case when the contract cost is deductible. Then the tax rate will
not matter for contract length, because the cut-oﬀ point for the distribution of contracts
is given by E (U1)− E (U2) − C =( 1− t)(b(E (L1) − E (L2))/(L0 (ε − 1)) − CU)=0 .




































Equation (17) says that the fraction of one-period contracts increases if price shocks
become larger. This is the standard result that larger nominal variability reduces contract
length (Ball, 1987; Ball et al., 1988). Here, it comes about because larger price variability
reduces expected employment, and hence also expected gross utility, with a two-period
contract.
Equation (18) shows that the fraction of one-period contracts increases with the
amount of supply shocks. The explanation is that increased variability of productivity
results in a larger employment diﬀerence, and thus also in a larger gross utility diﬀerence,
between one-period and two-period contracts due to the interaction with price variability,
as discussed above.
Equation (19), ￿nally, relates the length of wage contracts to the bene￿t level. Higher
unemployment compensation reduces the fraction of one-period contracts. There is a
simple intuition for this result. Because two-period contracts lead to higher expected
unemployment than one-period contracts, there is a higher unemployment risk for a rep-
resentative union member. Hence, the expected gross income gain from a rise in un-
employment compensation is larger under two-period contracts than under one-period
contracts.11 The incentive to choose two-period contracts is thus stronger the higher the
unemployment bene￿t.
To our knowledge, this eﬀect of the unemployment bene￿t level on contract length
has not been pointed out before. It means that a higher bene￿t level will not only raise
equilibrium unemployment but also make nominal wages more sticky, and thus increase
employment variations, in the case of nominal shocks. The result follows from the lack of
11This result follows directly from (10) and (14) Using the envelope theorem, we have dE (U1)/db =
∂E (U1)/∂b =( 1 − t)(1− E (L1)/L0) and dE (U2)/db = ∂E (U2)/∂b =( 1 − t)(1− E (L2)/L0).I t
follows that d((E (U1) − E (U2))/(1 − t))/db =( E (L2) − E (L1))/L0.
13certainty equivalence in our model.
4.2. Non-deductible contract costs
Consider next the case when the contract cost is not deductible. Because the cut-oﬀ
point for the distribution of contracts is then given by E (U1) − E (U2) − C =( 1− t)b
(E (L1) − E (L2))/L0 (ε − 1) − CU =0 , contract length in this case depends also on the





MF0(.)(b/((ε − 1)L0)(E (L2) − E (L1)))
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DF0 (.)(((1 − t)/L0)(E (L2) − E (L1)))
S
+
JF0 (.)((1/(ε − 1))(b/L0)(E (L2) − E (L1)))
S
< 0, (22)
where D>0, M>0, H<0, Q<0 and J>0 (see Appendix B). We assume that
the denominator S = D − HF0(.)(b/((ε − 1)L0)(E (L2) − E (L1))) > 0.T h i s c a n b e
interpreted as a ￿dynamic stability condition￿. It is illustrated in Figures 4-6. The x-
function shows that the fraction of one-period contracts, x, depends negatively on the
tax rate according to equation (6): a higher tax rate reduces the expected after-tax
income diﬀerence (gross of contract costs) between one-period and two-period contracts
and thus tends to make two-period contracts more attractive. The t-function shows that
the tax rate depends negatively on x according to the government budget constraint (7).
T h er e a s o ni st h a te x p e c t e de m p l o y m e n ti sh i g h e rw i t ho n e - p e r i o dt h a nw i t ht w o - p e r i o d
contracts, which results in a larger tax base and smaller expenditures on unemployment
14bene￿ts. So a larger x requires a lower tax rate. ￿Dynamic stability￿ requires that the
t-function is steeper than the x-function.
Equation (20) shows that it is no longer certain that larger price shocks will reduce
average contract length: the ￿rst term on the RHS is negative and the second is positive.
This can be explained by help of Figure 4. Larger price shocks shift the x-curve upwards,
because they mean a larger expected gross income diﬀerence between one-period and
two-period contracts at a given tax rate. This tends to raise x just as before. (The
economy moves from A to B with a constant tax rate). But larger price shocks also
shift the t-schedule to the right. The reason is that a higher tax rate is required at an
unchanged x, because larger price variability means lower expected employment in two-
period contracts, and hence a smaller tax base and larger costs for bene￿ts. This second
eﬀect tends to lower x, because a higher tax rate works in the direction of reducing the
after-tax gross income diﬀerence between one-period and two-period contracts. The tax
rate increase could be so large that increased price variability actually reduces the fraction
of short-term contracts (C might lie below A). Also this unexpected result follows from
the feature that our model does not exhibit certainty equivalence.
Equation (21) shows that larger productivity shocks increase the fraction of one-period
contracts unambiguously. The x-curve in Figure 5 is shifted upwards because an increase
in the variability of productivity increases the expected gross income diﬀerence between
one-period and two-period contracts at a given tax rate. This tends to raise x just as in
the case with a deductible contract cost. (The economy moves from A to B with a given
tax rate). Larger variability in productivity also shifts the t-schedule to the left, because
it means higher expected employment with two-period contracts, and hence a larger tax
base and lower costs for bene￿ts. The implied tax-rate reduction tends to increase the
expected after-tax income diﬀerence between one-period and two-period contracts (gross
of contract costs) even further. This eﬀect reinforces the increase in the frequency of
one-period contracts. (The economy moves to C.)
15Our earlier result that average contract length is increased by higher unemployment
compensation holds in this case, too: both terms on the RHS of (22) are negative. For
the same reason as in the case with a deductible contract cost, higher unemployment
compensation tends to reduce the expected income diﬀerence between one-period and
two-period contracts. This shifts the x-schedule downwards in Figure 6 and tends to
reduce the frequency of one-period contracts (the economy would move from A to B
with a constant tax rate). But the t- s c h e d u l ea l s os h i f t st ot h er i g h t . T h er e a s o ni s
that higher unemployment compensation requires a higher tax rate at a given x.T h e
tax-rate increase tends to reduce the expected after-tax income diﬀerence between one-
period and two-period contracts (gross of contract costs) even further. This reinforces the
reduction in the frequency of one-period contracts (the economy moves to C). So with
non-deductible contract costs, higher unemployment compensation leads to an increase
i na v e r a g ec o n t r a c tl e n g t ht h r o u g hb o t ha ne ﬀect on the expected before-tax income
diﬀerence between one-period and two-period contracts and a tax eﬀect.
5. Wage bargaining and contract length
A natural modi￿cation is to assume that the wage is set through bargaining rather than by
a monopoly union. More speci￿cally, we assume a Nash bargaining solution. Each union
tries as before to maximise the expected income of a representative member, whereas each
￿rm tries to maximise its pro￿t. The fall-back level of income for a union member in case
of disagreement is the unemployment bene￿t. The fall-back level of pro￿ti sz e r o .
5.1. One-period contracts
Consider ￿rst a one-period contract. The wage is obtained by maximisation of the Nash
bargaining product
(π)
β (U − U0)
1−β , (23)
16where 0 < β < 1 is the relative bargaining strength of the ￿rm, π and U are given by
equations (2) and (4) and U0 = b. Maximisation of the Nash bargaining product (23)





As is well known, the real wage under bargaining is also a mark-up on the real unemploy-
ment compensation, but the mark-up is smaller than in the monopoly union case. Using
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With a log-normal distribution for productivity, θ, we have as before that dE (θ ε)/dσ2
θ >































Larger variability in productivity thus leads to both higher expected employment and
higher expected pro￿t.
5.2. Two-period contracts
The wage in the second period of a two-period contract is set so that the Nash bargaining
product
[E (π)]
β [E (U − U0)]


























P (ε − 1/2)
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b. (12a)






























where 0 < φ < 1, as was derived in Section 3.3.S i n c edE (θ ε)/dσ2






























Both the expected employment and the expected pro￿t increase when variability in pro-
ductivity increases. Because dφ/dσ2
































i.e. the expected employment and the expected pro￿t fall when price variability increases.
18(9a) and (13a) give







−ε > 0. (15a)
(10a) and (14a) give
E (U1) − E (U2)=
(1 − β)
(ε − 1)
(E (L1) − E (L2))
L0
(1 − t)b>0. (16a)
(24), (25) and (15a) give
E (π1) − E (π2)=
ε − β
(ε − 1)
2 (E (L1) − E (L2))b>0.
So, as in Section 3, both the expected employment and the expected gross utility of a
union is higher with a one-period contract than with a two-period contract. In addition,
we have shown that the expected pro￿t is higher with a one-period contract than with
a two-period contract. This happens even though the real pro￿to ft h e￿rm, which can
be written π =( θ ε/(ε − 1))(W/P)
1−ε, is a convex function of the real wage, so that
variations of the real wage around a given expected level indeed raise the expected pro￿t.
The explanation, which is analogous to the discussion in Section 3.3,i st h a tt h ep r i c e
uncertainty in a contract with longer duration leads to a higher expected real wage.
5.3. Determination of contract length
The next step is to analyse the determination of contract length. Because we have assumed
a binary choice between one-period and two-period contracts, a Nash bargaining solution
is not appropriate. One possibility would be to let ￿rms and unions bargain on the
probability with which one-period and two-period contracts are chosen. But we shall
follow the simpler strategy of assuming that it is either unions or ￿rms that determine
contract length. We continue to assume that taxes are paid only by labour, so the budget
constraint (7) still holds.
Consider ￿rst the case when the union side decides on contract length. They are
assumed to incur the same contract costs in Section 2.2. It is straightforward to show
that all qualitative results are the same as in Section 4 (see Appendix C).
19Let us then turn to the case when contract length is determined by ￿rms. We then
assume that the contract costs for ￿rms, CF, also vary according to a cumulative dis-
tribution function, which we denote K (CF) and which has the same properties as the
F-function.
A ￿rm chooses a one-period contract if
E (π1) − CF >E(π2).
The fraction of one-period contracts is now given by
x = K [E (π1) − E (π2)]. (26)
Because taxes are paid only by the employees and the tax rate does not aﬀect the
wage, we do not now have to consider any tax repercussions. It suﬃces to diﬀerentiate









































(E (L1) − E (L2)) < 0. (29)
Equation (27) shows that employers, too, have an incentive to reduce contract length
when there is more uncertainty about prices and thus also about real wages. According
to (28), larger supply shocks increase the fraction of one-period contracts.
Equation (29) shows that higher unemployment compensation strengthens the incen-
tive to choose two-period contracts also when contract length is decided by employers. To
understand why, consider a 1 percent increase of the unemployment bene￿t, b.I ti sc l e a r
from (8a) and (11a) that this gives a 1 percent increase in the money wage in both one-
period and two-period contracts. From (24) and (25) we have that the expected pro￿ti s
reduced by (ε − 1) percent with both types of contracts. But because the expected pro￿t
is larger with a one-period contract than with a two-period contract, it follows that the
20pro￿t reduction is larger in absolute terms with one-period contracts than with two-period
contracts. So an increase in unemployment compensation will reduce the expected pro￿t
diﬀerence E (π1) − E (π2) and hence create an incentive also for employers to increase
contract length.
The upshot is thus that changes in macroeconomic variability and in unemployment
compensation aﬀect the incentives of employers and employees with regard to contract
length similarly. Both unions and ￿rms prefer shorter contracts when there is more
variability and longer contracts when unemployment bene￿ts are more generous.
6. Possible modiﬁcations of the analysis
This section discusses various modi￿cations of the assumptions. We focus on the impact
of unemployment bene￿ts. The following aspects are considered: (i) the assumption of
exogenously determined contract costs; (ii) the assumption of risk neutrality; and (iii)
the assumption that unemployment compensation is set in real terms.
6.1. Endogenous contract costs
We have assumed that contract costs are exogenous. Another possibility would be to
let them depend on real wages. Let us, for example, interpret contract cost as the costs
for labour services that are purchased. It is then natural to relate contract costs to the
aggregate real wage in the economy. To illustrate the argument let us assume that the
before-tax contract cost in each ￿rm is a ￿xed proportion of the aggregate real wage in








Assume then that λ is given by a cumulative distribution function Γ with the same
properties as the earlier F and K-functions. In the monopoly-union case with non-
21deductible contract costs, one-period contracts are now chosen if




so that the fraction of one-period contracts becomes
x = Γ
µ




There is now an additional eﬀect of a rise in unemployment compensation. It raises the
aggregate real wage in the economy and hence contract costs relative to the diﬀerence
in expected gross incomes between one-period and two-period contracts. This eﬀect also
tends to reduce the number of one-period contracts and hence to reinforce the increase in
average contract length.
6.2. Risk aversion
In Sections 2−5 we have assumed that union members are risk neutral. A natural question
is to which extent an assumption of risk aversion would change the analysis. The answer
is not very much. The conclusion that higher unemployment compensation tends to raise
expected utility more with a two-period than with a one-period contract, because the
former implies higher unemployment, still holds.





















where γ is the degree of relative risk aversion. If we replace (4) with (4a) in Sections









































































In analogy with the earlier analysis, it can be shown that Jensen￿s inequality implies that
0 < ρ < 1.12 Hence it again follows that









Now, consider the case when the (exogenous) contract cost is non-deductible so that
(6) applies. An appropriate interpretation could be that the contract cost represents
eﬀort which the representative union member has to expend on the writing of a contract.



















/((ε + γ − 1)L0)
¢




where Z>0, D>0 and T>0 (see Appendix D).
The ￿rst term in (30) represents as before a larger gain at a given tax rate of a rise in
unemployment compensation with a two-period contract than with a one-period contract.
Again, this follows because expected unemployment is higher with two-period contracts.
The second term captures the eﬀect on the utility diﬀerence of the tax rate increase that
12The proof is similar to the earlier one. ρ < 1 is equivalent to E (P ε) >E
¡
P ε+γ−1¢ ε
ε+γ−1 if γ < 1.L e t
P ε+γ−1 = x, so that P ε = f (x)=x
ε









or E (f (x)) >f(E (x)). According to Jensen￿s inequality this holds if f is convex which is the case if
γ < 1.I f γ > 1, ρ < 1 is equivalent to E (P ε) <E
¡
P ε+γ−1¢ ε
ε+γ−1. This holds according to Jensen￿s
inequality if f is concave, which is the case then.
23is necessary to ￿nance a rise in unemployment compensation As can be seen, the sign
of this tax eﬀect depends on the degree of relative risk aversion. If γ < 1 the tax eﬀect
tends to make two-period contracts relatively more favourable, just as in Section 4.I n
this case, average contract length thus increases unambiguously. But if γ > 1, the tax
eﬀect tends instead to make one-period contracts more favourable. Then it is no longer
clear how average contract length is aﬀected.
The explanation of the ambiguous tax eﬀect is that
E (U1) − E (U2)=
1
(ε + γ − 1)





from which follows that a rise in the tax rate, t, tends to decrease the expected gross
utility diﬀerence if γ < 1, but to increase it if γ > 1.
6.3. The determination of unemployment beneﬁts
The last point concerns the determination of unemployment compensation. We have
assumed it to be ￿xed in real terms. We could just as well have assumed it to be a
random variable, which is not known when the decision on contract length is taken. If the
real unemployment bene￿t is uncorrelated with the price, we would just have to substitute
E (b) for b in our expressions.
However, if the real value of the unemployment bene￿tw o u l d￿uctuate with prices,
the analysis would be diﬀerent. Assume for example, that the bene￿ti s￿xed in nominal
terms for both periods. Then it can be shown that the money wage in a one-period
contract will be set as a mark-up on the nominal bene￿t and will thus be independent
of the price. The same ￿xed money wage would be set in a one-period and two-period
contracts. So there would be the same variations in real wages when prices ￿uctuate in
the two types of contracts. Contract length would then no longer matter for expected
utility and would not be aﬀected by changes in the (nominal) bene￿t level. This would,
however, seem to be a peculiar model as contract length would be of no importance for
24the degree of nominal wage rigidity. It is also an institutional fact that wage contracts are
of longer duration than the periods for which the nominal values of government transfers,
such as unemployment compensation, are decided. To explain why this is the case is,
however, an important research topic in its own right.
7. Concluding comments
In policy discussions of labour market reform it is often taken for granted that the same
reforms will reduce both equilibrium unemployment and the variability of employment.
But no microeconomic underpinnings are usually presented for this view. We look at
one particular labour market institution, unemployment insurance, and derive from a
standard wage-setting model that a lower unemployment bene￿t level is indeed likely to
increase both equilibrium employment and nominal wage ￿exibility.
We show that lower unemployment bene￿ts reduce the average length of wage con-
tracts. The crucial feature giving this result is that our model does not exhibit certainty
equivalence. Contracts of longer duration are associated with higher expected real wage
levels and higher expected unemployment. So the unemployment risk is greater for a
representative union member under a long-term than under a short-term wage contract.
It follows that a reduction in the unemployment bene￿t level will reduce the expected
utility of a union member (gross of contract costs) more if contracts are long-term than if
they are short-term. Hence, such a reduction gives the union side an incentive to shorten
the duration of wage contracts. The incentives on the employer side are shown to work
in the same direction. In addition, there may be a tax eﬀect tending to give the same
result. Lower unemployment bene￿ts are associated with lower taxes. They increase the
expected income diﬀerence (gross of contract costs) between short-term and long-term
wage contracts and therefore tend to make the former relatively more attractive.
We also revisited the standard analysis of how nominal and real variability aﬀect
contract length. More variability in productivity always reduced contract length, whereas
25the eﬀect of larger price variability was ambiguous in the setting with non-deductible
contract costs. This was due to the fact that larger price variability tends to lower
expected employment and hence raise the tax rate. This works in the direction of reducing
the after-tax income gain of shorter wage contracts.
There are several natural extensions of our work. One would be to impose a richer
demand structure by abandoning the small-open-economy assumption of our analysis.
This is likely to open up the possibility of multiple equilibria. Another extension would
be to let contract length in each ￿rm be a continuous variable, which would allow us to
analyse the choice of contract length as the outcome of a bargaining process.
A key assumption has been that the unemployment bene￿t is determined in real
terms. Changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance then involves changes in
the minimum standard of living. But as the wage in this set-up is determined as a mark-
up over the unemployment bene￿t, it is not possible to analyse changes in the replacement
rate, i.e. in the relative income loss when unemployed. To do this would also be a natural
extension. It would also be interesting to examine the implications of other wage-setting
assumptions. Obvious candidates are insider-outsider models, eﬃciency-wage models and
models where wages are set in individual rather then in collective bargaining.
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28Appendix
A. Comparision of the one-period and two-period expected real
wages
The proposition in Section 3.3 that the expected real wage is higher in a two-period
contract than in a one-period contract, i.e. that E (W2/P) >E(W1/P),c a nb ep r o v e d




















Jensen￿s inequality also implies that (E (P))


































13We are grateful to Per Sj￿lin and Harald Lang for the proof.
29B. Determination of contract length with non-deductible con-
tract costs
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ε)φ +( 1− t)x(L0 − E (L1))
+(1− t)(1− x)(L0 − E (L2)) + ε(1 − t)(1− x)E (L2) > 0,
















































C. Union determination of contract length in the bargaining model
of Section 5.
C.1. Deductible contract costs
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C.2. Non-deductible contract costs











(1 − t)(1− β)
L0



























From (7), we can derive that





where the expressions for D and Q have the same form as in section B, and
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(1 − t)x(L0 − E (L1)) + (1 − t)(1− x)(L0 − E (L2)) + ε(1 − t)(1− x)E (L2) > 0,
and
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< 0.
D. The risk aversion case
The expressions for Z and T in (30) are given by
Z = tx(ε − 1)E (L1)
µ
ε
(ε + γ − 1)
¶ 1
1+γ
+t(1 − x)(ε − 1)
µ
ε















+(1− t)x(L0 − E (L1)) + (1 − t)xεE (L1)+( 1− t)(1− x)(L0 − E (L2))
+ε(1 − t)(1− x)E (L2) > 0,
and
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b(1 − t)(E (L2) − E (L1)),
and the expression for D has the same form as in section B. T is positive for the same
reason of ￿dynamic stability￿ as in the risk-neutral case.







































33Figure 3: The concavity of the union utility function
W/P
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